Putin Loses Armenia: What Pashinyan’s Third Electoral Victory Means for Regional Geopolitics

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has secured a decisive third electoral victory, a result that carries profound implications for the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus and signals a dramatic shift in Armenia’s strategic orientation away from its traditional ally Russia. The election results demonstrate that Armenian voters have endorsed Pashinyan’s controversial but pragmatic approach to foreign policy, which increasingly looks westward toward the European Union while seeking to normalize relations with neighboring Azerbaijan after decades of conflict.

The scale of Pashinyan’s victory surprised many analysts who had predicted a closer race given the traumatic losses Armenia suffered in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the subsequent 2023 Azerbaijani military operation that effectively ended Armenian control over the disputed territory. These devastating defeats, which resulted in the displacement of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from Karabakh, had been expected to severely damage Pashinyan’s political standing. Instead, Armenian voters appear to have accepted his argument that the country must adapt to new realities rather than cling to unattainable maximalist positions that previous governments had maintained for nearly three decades.

The implications for Russia’s influence in the region cannot be overstated. For over three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia has been Moscow’s most reliable ally in the South Caucasus, hosting a Russian military base in Gyumri and participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia’s answer to NATO. However, this relationship has deteriorated dramatically following what Armenians widely perceive as Russia’s failure to fulfill its security commitments during the 2020 war and subsequent Azerbaijani military actions. Russian peacekeepers deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh proved unable or unwilling to prevent Azerbaijan’s final takeover of the region in September 2023, leaving many Armenians feeling betrayed by their supposed protector.

Pashinyan has responded to this perceived abandonment by accelerating Armenia’s pivot toward the West. His government has frozen participation in CSTO activities, welcomed European Union monitoring missions along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, and initiated discussions about potential EU membership – a dramatic departure from Armenia’s previous membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. The Prime Minister has articulated a vision of what he calls “Real Armenia,” urging citizens to focus on building a prosperous, democratic state within internationally recognized borders rather than pursuing territorial claims that have led to repeated military defeats.

Western press analysis has identified three crucial elements that will determine whether Armenia can successfully complete this geopolitical reorientation. First, Yerevan must reach a comprehensive peace agreement with Baku that addresses outstanding issues including border demarcation, the status of transportation corridors, and the rights of remaining Armenian populations near the border regions. Azerbaijan has demanded the so-called “Zangezur corridor” connecting its main territory to the Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia, a requirement that has proven contentious in negotiations. Finding compromise on this issue remains essential for any lasting settlement.

Second, Armenia must navigate the delicate process of reducing dependence on Russian economic and security infrastructure without triggering a severe backlash from Moscow. Russia still provides Armenia with crucial energy supplies, and thousands of Armenian migrant workers in Russia send remittances that constitute a significant portion of the country’s GDP. The Russian military base in Gyumri, while increasingly viewed with ambivalence by many Armenians, cannot simply be closed overnight without alternative security arrangements in place. European and American policymakers have signaled willingness to support Armenia’s transition, but concrete commitments remain limited.

Third, and perhaps most challenging, Pashinyan must manage domestic expectations while pursuing policies that require acknowledging painful losses. Armenian society remains deeply traumatized by recent events, and nationalist opposition forces continue to accuse the Prime Minister of betraying the nation’s historic claims. The Armenian diaspora, particularly influential communities in France, Russia, and the United States, has been divided over Pashinyan’s approach, with some viewing it as necessary pragmatism and others as unacceptable capitulation. Maintaining public support for difficult compromises will require skillful political communication and tangible improvements in living standards.

The broader regional context adds additional complexity to Armenia’s situation. Turkey, which has historically supported Azerbaijan and maintains closed borders with Armenia dating back to the 1990s conflict, has indicated conditional willingness to normalize relations if Yerevan reaches agreement with Baku. Such normalization could unlock significant economic opportunities for landlocked Armenia, potentially transforming the country into a transit hub connecting European and Asian markets. Meanwhile, Iran watches developments carefully, wary of any arrangement that might reduce its influence or create new complications along its northern border. As Pashinyan begins his third term, the decisions made in Yerevan will reshape not only Armenia’s future but the entire strategic balance of a region where Russian, Western, Turkish, and Iranian interests collide.